John Perry's "Dialogue On Personal Identity and Immortality" Dilemma

     What is identity? Moreover, what constitutes having one? In John Perry’s, “Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality” the characters consider a case where a woman named Julia has her healthy brain transplanted into the body of another woman, Mary. A dilemma is then posed, who survives this operation? To be specific, whose identity survives? I will begin by defining identity in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. Then, I will explain why I have defined it in that certain way. Lastly, with the definition formed, I will use it to defend my argument; the survivor of the operation cannot be identified wholly as neither Julia nor Mary. Identity is a largely debated topic in the faculty of philosophy, and I present to you one angle of comprehension. 

    To start, I will define what identity is. Keep in mind, when I mention identity throughout this essay, I am strictly referring to human beings. Also, when mentioning mental state, it will be synonymous to the terms such as mind, consciousness, and soul; they differ slightly in terms of definition, but for this essay, they will all remain as terms with the same meaning. With that being said, I will move on to my definition of what identity is. The concept of identity revolves around how people identify you (objectivity) and how you identify yourself (subjectivity). As well, it has to have been formed (brought into existence) and cannot be replaced with any foreign parts. Thus, identity will be defined as the composition of both appearance (how others identify you) and mental state (how you identify yourself) that cannot be replaceable with any foreign parts. Identity cannot consist of just mental state or just appearance. Both the mind and the way you look are interconnected in what defines identity.

When we look at the case of Mary and Julia, the appearance changed (objectivity), but the mental state (subjectivity) remained stable. Therefore, it can be said that the memories of Julia are still intact. So shouldn’t that be evident enough to claim that mental state should be the sole defining factor of identity? There can be many objections to this claim. For one, the memories can be classified as false memory. There remains a strong possibility that the memories of Julia in Mary’s body could be false or made up. It is a plausible phenomenon to occur, after all it was a brain transplant. We will never know whether the “recalled memory” did happen or not. Which takes me to the second point, mental state is not empirical. How can we even tell whether the memories of Julia are indeed false memory, or not? We cannot see the mind, therefore everything is left to assumptions and hypotheses. I will continue off this point later down the essay. Lastly, when put in another body, there is a chance of behavioural change. The new body could limit you to become who you were before; for example, a pro body builder’s consciousness put into the body of an obese man. The person would have a hard time trying to be who he was before and pragmatically speaking, he would most likely adapt or adjust to a certain new form of identity. Can you really be who you were if, for example, you had physiological constraints that you didn’t have before? Therefore, with the arguments presented, it becomes clear that the aspect of appearance plays a crucial role in the composition of what identity is.

Now, it can be said that how you identify yourself is more important than how others identify you. However, the way you appear is just as important as your mental state. As I have mentioned above, consciousness is not empirical. In terms of objectivity, people identify others by the way they look. Empiricism seems to be the most convenient form of validation. People are accustomed to identifying people or objects by the way they appear. For example, how would people go about identifying objects such as chairs or tables? By the way it looks, of course. So how would people identify other people? Of course, by the same principle. However, we cannot see the soul. When one is about to talk to his friend, it’s obvious he will identify his friend by the way he appears or else he will never identify the friend whom he wanted to talk to. The aspect of appearance gives a certain form of validation in knowing who one is talking to. Therefore, we will never know whether the survivor is truly Julia or Mary. Even if we were to say Julia was the survivor because her consciousness is still there, we will never know for sure. Thus, if Julia were to go back to her life, people will not be able to identify her as who she was before. Even if she tried to explain or maybe recall memories she shared with others, there will always remain a form of skepticism that she could not be Julia. Let us say for instance, an example of recovering personal information. If somebody was able to answer all the security questions online, does that mean that he really is the true owner of the account?

With the given definition, I will now try to solve the dilemma of who survives the operation. For reasons of simplification, I will say the survivor of the operation to be X. As I have mentioned in the introductory phase, X cannot be neither wholly Julia nor Mary. Instead, it will form a new identity, consisting of partial qualities that Julia and Mary possessed. The given definition states that identity is the composition of both mental state and appearance that cannot be replaceable. Prior to the operation, there existed two identities: Mary and Julie. After the operation, there existed none. Since Julie’s brain was separated from her body, and Mary’s body separated from her brain, it fulfills the definition to say that neither of their identity exists. Before, Julie and Mary was the composition of their own mental state and appearance. The operation essentially separated the composition of their identity. The reason I argue that X is a new identity is because it was a new composition of both mind (Julia’s brain) and appearance (Mary’s body). Person X is the makeup of Julie’s subjective aspect and Mary’s objective aspect. Therefore, the survivor of the operation is neither wholly Julia nor Mary, but instead a new identity.

In summary, I believe I have presented an ample argument as to what identity is. Subjectivity and objectivity are crucial components to the composition of an identity. Furthermore, when considering who survives the operation in John Perry’s, “Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality”, the definition that I have given clearly points out that the survivor of the operation cannot be identified wholly as neither Julia nor Mary. Instead, it will form a new identity consisting of Julia’s mental state and Mary’s appearance. In conclusion, this essay did not cover all aspects of this largely debated issue of identity, however, this angle of view that I have presented is sufficient to answer the dilemma of who survives the operation.